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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables two trusted parties Alice and Bob to share a provably secure secret key by preparing and measuring quantum states that are transmitted through a noisy channel controlled by an eavesdropper Eve. One of the major challenges to make QKD practical is to increase the number of secure bits generated per second [1] . That is why most QKD experiments to date use photons as the quantum information carriers; and these photons come from phase randomize Poissonian distributed sources instead of the much less efficient single photon sources. In addition, decoy state method is used to combat Eve's photon-number-splitting attack on multiple photon events emitted from the Poissonian sources [2, 3] . From the theoretical point of view, a more convenient figure of merit is the key rate, namely, the number of provably secure secret bits per average number of photon pulses prepared by Alice. This is because key rate measures the intrinsic performance of a QKD protocol (in other words, the software issue) without taking the frequency of the pulse (which is a hardware issue) into account.
Provably secure lower bounds of key rates (we refer them as simply as key rates from now on) for various QKD schemes for the realistic situation of finite raw key length have been reported. For instance, Lim et al. [4] computed the key rates of a certain implementation of the BB84 QKD scheme [5] using three types of decoy; recently, Chau [6] extended it to the case of using more than three types of decoys. Hayashi and Nakayama investigated the key rate for the BB84 scheme [7] . Brádler et al. showed the key rate for a qudit-based QKD scheme using up to three mutually unbiased preparation and measurement bases [8] . And Wang et al. proved that errors and fluctuations in the decoy photon intensities only have minor errors on the final key rate [9] . Note that the provably secure key rate of a QKD scheme is found using the following three-step strategy. First, the yields Q B,µn and error rates E B,µn conditioned on the preparation and measurement basis B as well as the photon intensity parameter µ n used are determined by comparing the relevant Bob's measurement outcomes, if any, with Alice's preparation states. The second step is to deduce yields and error rates conditioned on the number of photons emitted by the source. Recall that for a phase randomized Poissonian photon source,
and
Here, µ 1 > µ 2 > ⋯ > µ k ≥ 0 are the photon intensities used in the decoy method with k ≥ 2. Using the result in Ref. [9] , we simply our discussion by assuming that these photon intensities are accurately determined and fixed throughout the experiment. Moreover, Y B,m is the probability of photon detection by Bob given that the photon pulse sent by Alice contains m photons and e B,m is the bit error rate for m photon emission events prepared in the B basis [2, 3, 10] . The key rate R depends on Y B,0 , Y B,1 and e B,1 [2] [3] [4] 10] . Nevertheless, the later quantities cannot be determined precisely because Eqs. (1) and (2) are under-determined systems of equations given Q B,µn 's and E B,µn 's provided that the number of photon intensities used k is finite. To make things worse, in the finite-raw-key-length (FRKL) situation, the measured values of Q B,µn 's and E B,µn 's deviate from their true values due to finite sampling. Fortunately, effective lower bounds of Y B,0 and Y B,1 as well as upper bound of e B,1 are available [2-4, 6, 10, 11] . In the FRKL situation, these bounds can be deduced with the help of Hoeffding's inequality [12] . (See, for example, Refs. [4, 6] for details.) The third step is to deduce R from these bounds [2-4, 8, 10] . Computing lower bound of R using this indirect strategy is not satisfactory in the FRKL situation because it is unlikely for each of the finite-size fluctuations in Q B,µn 's and E B,µn 's to decrease the value of the provably secure key rate. In fact, for a given security parameter, the worst case bounds on Y B,0 and Y B,1 cannot be not attained simultaneously if the raw key length is finite. (This is evident, say, from the bounds of Y B,0 and Y B,1 given by Inequalities (2) and (3) in Ref. [4] or Inequalities (12a) and (12b) in Ref. [6] . Note that there is a typo in Inequality (12b) -the Q . In all cases, the finite-size statistical fluctuation that leads to the saturation of lower bound for Y B,0 does not cause the saturation of the lower bound for Y B,1 and vice versa.)
It is more effective if one could directly investigate the influence of finite-key-length on the key rate. To do so, one has to go beyond the use of Hoeffding's inequality to bound the statistical fluctuation, which only works for equally weighted sum of random variables that are either statistical independent or drawn from a finite population without replacement [12] . Here we use the computation of the key rate of a specific BB84 QKD protocol [5] that generates the raw key solely from X basis measurement results as an example to illustrate how to directly tackle statistical fluctuation in the FRKL situation by means of McDiarmid-type inequality [13] in statistics. The technique used here can be easily adapted to compute the key rates of other QKD schemes using finite-dimensional qudits in the FRKL situation. Our work here is based on an earlier preprint by one of the us [14] . Here we greatly extend and improve the original proposal by first proving a new and slightly extended McDiarmid-type of inequality on so-called centering sequences. (See Def. 1 for the precise definition of a centering sequence.) Then we apply it through four different methods, each giving a separate provably secure key rate. We also optimize the provably secure key rate R by expoiting our freedom to pick the centering sequences. To our knowledge, this is the first time such an optimization is performed. In contrast, this type of optimization is not possible in previous approach that makes use of a less general inequality known as Hoeffding's inequality. It turns out that each method works best in different situations; and the best provably secure key rate among the four methods in realistic practical situation is at least about 10% better than the state-of-the-art method before Ref. [14] . Moreover, for raw key length ℓ raw ≈ 10 5 to 10 7 , this work almost double the secure key rate of the original proposal in Ref. [14] when four different photon intensities are used.
II. FINITE-SIZE DECOY STATE KEY RATE
Recall that the error rate for this particular BB84 QKD scheme is lower-bounded by [4, 6] 
where p X denotes the probability that Alice (Bob) uses X as the preparation (measurement) basis, ⟨f (µ)⟩ ≡ ∑ k n=1 p µn f (µ n ) with p µn being the probability for Alice to use photon intensity parameter µ n . Furthermore,
is the binary entropy function, e p is the phase error rate of the single photon events in the raw key, and Λ EC is the actual number of bits of information that leaks to Eve as Alice and Bob perform error correction on their raw bits. It is given by
if they use the most efficient (classical) error correcting code to do the job. In addition, ℓ raw is the raw sifted key length measured in bits, ǫ cor is the upper bound of the chance that the final secret keys shared between Alice and Bob are different, Eve's information on the final key is at most ǫ sec [15] [16] [17] . Last but not least, χ is a QKD scheme specific factor which depends on the detailed security analysis used. In general, χ may also depend on other factors used in the QKD scheme such as the number of photon intensities k [4, 6] . For BB84, e p → e Z,1 as ℓ raw → +∞. More importantly, the best known bound on the difference between e p and e Z,1 due to finite sample size correction using properties of the hypergeometric distribution reported in given by [6, 18] 
with probability at least 1 − ǫ sec χ, wherē
and s B is the number of bits that are prepared and measured in B basis. Clearly, s X = ℓ raw and
(Note thatγ becomes complex if a, c, d are too large. This is because in this case no e p ≥ e Z,1 exists with failure probability a. We carefully picked parameters here so thatγ is real.)
In the infinite-key-length limit, statistical fluctuations of Q B,µn and E B,µn can be ignored. Then based on the analysis in Ref. [6] with typos corrected, one has
where k 0 = 1(2) if k is even (odd), and∏ j≠n is over the dummy variable j from k 0 to k but skipping n. In addition, S n = ∑ ′′ µ t1 µ t2 ⋯µ t k−k 0 −1 where the double primed sum is over k 0 ≤ t 1 < t 2 < ⋯ < t k−k0−1 ≤ k with t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t k−k0−1 ≠ n. (In other words, a 01 = a 21 = 0 if k is odd and a 11 = 0 if k is even.) Note that in our subsequent analysis, we also need the following two inequalities, which can be proven using the same method as in Inequality (7b):
whereĒ Z,µn = 1 − E Z,µn . Substituting Inequalities (5) and (7) into Expression (3) gives the following lower bound of the key rate
where
(The cases of Y X,0 or Y X,1 = 0 can be dealt with in the same way by changing the definition of b n accordingly. But these cases are not interesting for they likely imply R = 0 in realistic channels.) Note that the worst case key rate corresponds to the situation that the spin flip and phase shift errors in the raw key are uncorrelated so that Alice and Bob cannot use the correlation information to increase the efficiency of entanglement distillation. Thus, we may separately consider statistical fluctuations in Q X,µn 's and e Z,1 in the FRKL situation.
III. AN IMPROVED VERSION OF MCDIARMID INEQUALITY
Statistical fluctuations in Q X,µn 's and e Z,1 can be bounded using McDiarmid-type inequality. Actually, the first inequality of this type was proven for the case of statistically independent random variables using martingale technique in Ref. [13] . The inequality we need here is a straightforward extension of Theorem 6.7 in Ref. [13] and Theorem 2.3 in Ref. [19] for statistically dependent random variables. (See also a closely related version in Ref. [20] .)
We first introduce the concept of a centering sequence [19] . The definition below is written in a more apparent manner to physicists.
. . , W t ) be a random real vector whose components W i 's are possibly statistically dependent random variables each taking values in the set W i . Let f m be a real-valued bounded function of W. Set Note that centering property implicitly depends on the distribution of W through the conditional expectation value of U m . Moreover, {V m } is centering if {V m } is a martingale. Theorem 1. Using notations in Definition 1, for a fixed i = 1, 2, . . . , t, let w m ∈ W m and set
Here the symbols ess sup and ess inf denote the essential supremum and infimum, respectively. Further setr
for any δ > 0, where Pr(⋅) denotes the occurrence probability of the argument.
Remark 1. This version of McDiarmid inequality is slightly stronger than the one reported in Ref. [13] as we also utilize information of w in obtainingr whereas the original version in Ref. [13] made use of the worst case w. The proof of this theorem is based on that of Theorem 2.2 in Ref. [19] .
Proof. Note that for any h, δ > 0, 
To proceed, we consider the function g(
It is straightforward to check that g(0) = dg dh h=0 = 0. Moreover,
with the equality holds whenever
for any h > 0. The R.H.S. of Inequality (14) is minimized by setting h = 4δ r 2 ; and with this h, Inequality (14) becomes Inequality (11a).
Finally, by applying the same argument to −f m 's instead of f m 's, we get Inequality (11b). This completes our proof. Proof. This proof is adapted from Example 1 in Ref. [19] . From Definition 1, it suffices to show that
is a decreasing function of υ. Suppose W i 's are drawn from a collection of M objects out of which M j of them take the value α j for all j. Suppose further that among W i 's with 1 ≤ i < m, there are m j of them taking the value of α j for all j. Then, the probability that
By applying Theorem 1 to {U m }, we have r m = ess sup{W m V m−1 = υ} − ess inf{W m V m−1 = υ} = ess sup W − ess inf W = Width(W) for all m and V m−1 . Hence, it is proved.
Remark 2. The above corollary was first proven by Hoeffding in Ref. [12] without using the concept of centering sequence. Actually, Corollary 1 is more often referred to as the Hoeffding's inequality. In fact, Hoeffding's inequality has been used to compute the provably secure key rate R when the raw key length ℓ raw is finite in previous works [4, [6] [7] [8] . In Sec. IV below, we use the above corollary to bound e Z,1 in Methods A and B.
Corollary 2. Let W = (W 1 , . . . , W t ) be a random vector where each W m takes on value from a bounded set of real numbers W = {α j } k j=1 . Suppose W m 's are multivariate hypergeometrically distributed in the sense that they are chosen without replacement from a collection of M objects out of which M j of them take the value of α j for all j. Let x ∈ [ess inf W, ess sup W] and y > 0 be two fixed numbers. Let P ∶ {1, 2, . . . , t} ↦ {1, 2, . . . , t} be an arbitrary but fixed permutation. Suppose (16) for m = 1, 2, . . . , t. Then, the sequence {V m } t m=1 is centering provided that
where δ is a small correlation term of the order of Width(W) (y + tx) 2 . Furthermore, by picking x to be the R.H.S. of Inequality (17), then Inequality (11) is true witĥ
where {w P (i) } is a decreasing sequence.
Proof. Since (W P (1) , W P (2) , . . . , W P (t) ) is also a multivariate hypergeometrically distributed random vector, we only need to prove the case when P is an identity operator as the general case can be proven in the same way. Observe that
Moreover, after the elementary change,
with 
where ξ 2 , ξ 3 ∈ [0, 1]. And the correlation term
A sufficient condition for {V m } to be centering is g 1 ∆w + g 2 ≤ 0 for all m and w. Moreover, this condition is satisfied if
for all m = 1, . . . , t and for all (m − 1)w = ∑ (22) is consistent with the constraint that ess inf W ≤ x ≤ ess sup W because this inequality is trivially satisfied when x = ess inf W.) Hence, {V m } is centering if Inequality (17) holds.
We now switch back to consider the situation of an arbitrary but fixed permutation P . To optimize the bound in Theorem 1, we use the freedom to pick a suitable permutation P to minimizer. From Theorem 1,r m =
which is a decreasing function of both x and w. Hence, the optimal situation occurs when we pick the permutation so that w P (i) is a decreasing function of i. In this case, ∑ m i=1 w P (i) m is a decreasing function of m. In this way, we arrive atr 2 in Eq. (18) .
Remark 3. The ability to optimizer by means of picking the best possible permutation P and hence the best possible centering sequence is a novel feature of McDairmid inequality. As far as we know, this feature has not been exploited before. In contrast, from the proof of Corollary 1, it is clear that the value ofr obtained from the Hoeffding's inequality does not depend on the choice of P . In Sec. IV below, we fully expoit this freedom of picking P to bound e Z,1 in Method D. Note however that the above Corollary requires the knowledge of M j 's. In addition,r 2 is written as a rather involved sum. Let us replace every w P (i) in Eq. (18) by the average observed value, namely, ∑ 
which does not depend on the knowledge of M j 's. This expression forr shall be used to bound e Z,1 in Method C to be reported in Sec. IV.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE IMPROVED MCDIARMID INEQUALITY IN FINDING THE KEY RATE
There is a subtlety in applying Theorem 1 to study the statistical fluctuation of e Z,1 . A naive way to do so is to use Inequalities (5) and (7) to obtain the bound e Z,1 ≤ (∑ k n=1 a 2n Q Z,µn E Z,µn ) (∑ k n=1 a 1n Q Z,µn ). Then one could regard Q Z,µn 's and Q Z,µn E Z,µn 's as random variables and directly apply Theorem 1 and Definition 1 to the R.H.S. of the above inequality. Nonetheless, it does not work for the R.H.S. of this inequality need not be bounded. Besides, the bound obtained is not strong enough even if we ignore the boundedness problem.
To proceed, we first write Q Z,µn = ∑ jWnj s Z,µn wheres Z,µn is the number of photon pulses that Alice prepares using photon intensity µ n and that Alice prepares and Bob tries to measure (but may or may not have detection) in Z basis. In addition,W nj denotes the possibly correlated random variable whose value is 1 (0) if the jth photon pulse among thes Z,µn photon pulses is (not) detected by Bob. Clearly,s Z,µn ≈ T p 2 Z p µn with T being the total number of photon pulses sent by Alice and p Z = 1 − p X is the probability for Alice (Bob) to prepare (measure) in the Z basis.
Here W Z,i is the random variable that takes the value a 1n p µn if the ith photon pulse that are prepared by Alice and then successfully measured by Bob both in the Z basis is in fact prepared using photon intensity µ n . Recall that Eve knows the number of photons in each pulse and may act accordingly. However, she does not know the photon intensity parameter used in each pulse and the preparation basis until the pulse is measured by Bob. Hence, W Z,n 's may be correlated. Actually, the most general situation is that W Z,n 's are drawn from a larger population without replacement. That is to say, these random variables obey the multivariate hypergeometric distribution. By the same argument, Inequalities (7c) and (7d) gives
where s e Z = s Z ⟨Q Z,µ E Z,µ ⟩ ⟨Q Z,µ ⟩ and sē Z = s Z ⟨Q Z,µĒZ,µ ⟩ ⟨Q Z,µ ⟩) are the number of bits that are prepared and successfully measured in the Z basis such that the preparation by Alice and measurement result by Bob are unequal and equal, respectively. Moreover, W e Z,i 's (Wē Z,i 's) are multivariate hypergeometrically distributed random variables taking values in the set
Interestingly, these two inequalities can be used to give four different bounds on the finite-size statistical fluctuations in e Z,1 . More importantly, these four bounds are 
) with probability at most ǫ e Z . Since W e Zi and W Z,j are positively correlated, from Inequalities (24a), (24b) and (25a), we have
with probability at least 1 − ǫ Z − ǫ e Z , where
Incidentally, this is the method reported in the preprint by one of us in Ref. [14] . Moreover, similar bounds on statistical fluctuations of Q B,n 's and Q B,1 E B,1 have been obtained using Hoeffding's inequality in Refs. [4, 6] . That method is not as effective as the one reported here since they indirectly deal with finite sampling statistical fluctuation of Y Z,1 and Y Z,1 e Z,1 .
B. Alternatively, we may use Inequality (25b) and Corollary 1 to bound e Z,1 . Specifically, the true value of ∑ sē Z j=1 Wē Z,j is less than the observed value by
) with probability at most ǫē Z . Note that W e Z,j 's and Wē Z,j 's are statistically independent. Therefore, from Inequalities (24b), (24c) and (25b), we have
(26d) with probability at least 1 − ǫ e Z − ǫē Z , where ∆Y Z,1 e Z,1 is given by Eq. (26b) and
C
with probability at least 1 − ǫē Z − ǫ e Z , where
provided that Inequalities (15) and (17) hold. (See Ref. [21] for an alternative proof of this result.)
D. There is an alternative way to apply Inequality (25b) and Corollary 2 to find ∆e Z,1 in Inequality (26f), which is quite aggressive. Since ∑ t i=1 w i t is an estimate of Y Z,1 e Z,1 = ⟨w⟩, we know from Corollary 1 and Inequality (7e) that ⟨w⟩ ≥ ∑ k n=1 a 1n Q Z,µn E Z,µn − ∆Y Z,1 e Z,1 with probability at least 1 − ǫ e Z . In other words, by fixing t = s 
As w P (m) 's are arranged in descending order and W in our case is the set {⟨Q Z,µ ⟩a 2n (p µn s Z )} k n=1 of at most k elements, R.H.S. of the above inequality can be simplified to a big sum of at most k terms. To be more explicit, suppose the descending sequence {w P (m) } t m=1 contains n (1) copies of w (1) , followed by n (2) copies of w (2) , and so on until ending with n (k) copies of
which is efficient to compute. (Note that the sum in R.H.S. of Eq. (18) is a decreasing function of x and w P (i) 's, the above integral approximation is accurate up to a correction term of at most Width(W)
this correction can be safely ignored in practice provided that t = s e Z ≳ 10 4 .) In this way, Inequality (26f) holds with probability at least 1 − ǫē Z − 2ǫ 
wherer is given by the R.H.S. of Inequality (26i).
In reality, we use the minimum of the above four methods to upper-bound the value of e Z,1 . To study the statistical fluctuation of R, it remains to consider the fluctuation of Q X,µn in the first term in Expression (8) . (Although the second term also depends on Q X,µn 's implicitly through Λ EC , statistical fluctuation is absent from this term. This is because Λ EC is the amount of information leaking to Eve during classical post-processing of the measured raw bits. Thus, it depends on the observed values of Q X,µn 's and E X,µn 's instead of their true values.) Using the same technique as in the estimation of statistical fluctuation in e Z,1 , the first term of Expression (8) . Here b n is given by Eq. (9) with e p equals the R.H.S. of Inequality (5) where e Z,1 is given by any one of the following four equations depending on which of the four methods we use: Eq. (26a), (26d), (26f) and (26j). Corollary 1 implies that due to statistical fluctuation, the true value of the first term in Expression (8) ) with probability at most ǫ X . We remark that this way of finding a lower bound for ∑ n b n Q X,µn is more direct than the standard one that separately bounds Y X,0 and Y X,1 [4, 6, 8, 11] .
Putting everything together and by setting ǫ X = ǫ Z = ǫ e Z = ǫē Z = ǫγ = ǫ sec χ, we conclude that the secret key rate R satisfies
where b n = b n (e p ) is given by Eq. (9) . Here e p equals the R.H.S. of Inequality (5) with e Z,1 given by Eq. (26a), (26d), (26f) or (26j). Note that χ = 9 = 4 + 1 + 4 for Methods A to C and χ = 10 for Method D. (Here the first number 4 comes from the generalized chain rule for smooth entropy in Ref. [4] , the number 1 comes from the finite-size correction of the raw key in Eq. (B1) of Ref. [4] , and the last number 4 comes from ǫγ, ǫ X , ǫ e Z as well as either ǫ Z or ǫē Z . Moreover, χ for Method D is larger than the rest by 1 because of the extra condition on the statistical fluctuation of a lower bound of Y Z,1 e Z,1 .) Interestingly, unlike the schemes used in Refs. [4, 6, 7] , the number χ in our scheme is independent on the number of photon intensities k used. This is because we directly tackle the finite sample statistical fluctuations of quantities like Y B,1 . Note however that even though χ does not depend on k, it does not mean that one could use arbitrarily large number of photon intensities as decoys (so as to obtain better bounds on quantities like Y B,1 ) without adversely affecting the key rate for a fixed finite s X . The reason is that Width({a 1n p µn } k n=1 }), Width({a 2n p µn } k n=1 }) and Width({b n p µn } k n=1 }) diverge as k → +∞ due to divergence of a 1n , a 2n and b n [6] as well as the decrease in min{p µn } k n=1 . Recall that computing a 1n , a 2n and b n is numerically stable and with minimal lost in precision if µ n − µ n+1 ≳ 0.1 for n = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1 [6] . This means the number of photon intensities k used in practice should be ≲ 10.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
We study the following quantum channel, which models a commonly used 100 km long optical fiber in QKD experiments, to test the performance of this new key rate formula in realistic situation. The findings here are generic as the general trend and performance improvement are also found in other situations including using the same fiber of different lengths as well as other randomly generated quantum channels. The yield and error rate of that quantum channel is given by Q B,µ = (1 + p ap )d µ and Q B,µ E B,µ = p dc + e mis [1 − exp(−η ch µ)] + p ap d µ 2, where
Here we fix after pulse probability p ap = 4 × 10 −2 , dark count probability p dc = 6 × 10 −7 , error rate of the optical system e mis = 5 × 10 −3 . In addition, the transmittance of the system η sys = 0.1η ch , and the transmittance of the fiber is given by η ch = 10 −0.2L 10 with L is the length of the fiber in km. These parameters are obtained from optical fiber experiment on a 100 km long fiber in Ref. [22] ; and have been used in Refs. [4, 6] to study the performance of decoy-state QKD in the FRKL situation. We also follow Refs. [4, 6] by using the following security parameters: ǫ cor = κ = 10 −15 , where ǫ sec = κℓ final with ℓ final ≈ Rs X (p Table I compares the optimized key rates for the state-of-the-art method reported recently Eq. (3) of Ref. [6] with Eq. (27) for various s X and k. (This is the best provably secure key rate obtained before the posting of the original proposal using McDiarmid inequality by one of us in Ref. [14] .) The optimized rates are found by fixing the minimum photon intensity to 1 × 10 −6 , while maximizing over p X as well as all other photon intensities µ n 's and all the p µn 's. For Method D, the optimized key rate depends on the actual Z-basis measurement results. Here we simply fix n (i) 's to their expectation values.
The table clearly shows that using McDiarmid inequality improves the optimized key rates in almost all cases. It also shows that for any method used, the provably secure key rate increases as the raw key length s X increases. And they all gradually converge to the same infinite-size key rate. Besides, the asymptotic key rate generally increases with k. These are natural as longer s X implies smaller finite-size statistical fluctuation and larger number of decoys k used allows better estimation of the bounds of various Y B,m 's and Y B,1 e B,1 's.
Among the four methods introduced here, Method A almost always gives the least provably secure key rate. This implies that it is more effective to estimate a lower bound for Y Z,1 via estimating an upper bound for Y Z,1 e Z,1 plus a lower bound for Y Z,1ēZ,1 . Method B is slightly better than Method C for large s X (say when ≳ 10 8 , the improvement is about a few percent). Method D is about 5-15% or so better than Method C when 10 8 ≲ s X ≲ 10 11 . This is not unexpected for the following reason. Although Method D is more aggressive than Method C in estimating the statistical fluctuation of e Z,1 and hence the key rate, it requires an additional condition for lower-bounding ⟨w⟩. Thus the value of χ for Method D is 1 greater than that of Method C. As a result, for small raw key length, the improvement in estimating e Z,1 for Method D may not be able to compensate the need to control the statistical fluctuation of one more variable. Table I also depicts that Method D is about 5 − 20% better than Method B when 10 8 ≲ s X ≲ 10 11 . Furthermore, for fixed s Z and κ and a fixed method to compute bound for e Z,1 , the provably secure key rate reaches a maximum at a finite k. This is not unexpected because even though the χ we deduce is independent of the number photon intensities k used, Width(W) diverges as k → +∞. Last but not least, in the case of k = 4, Method D always gives the best key rate. We do not have a good answer to this observation. It is instructive to study why in future.
VI. SUMMARY
To summarize, for s X ≈ 10 5 − 10 6 , at least one of the four methods reported here could produce a provably secure key rate that is at least twice that of the state-of-the-art method. And for s X ≈ 10 8 , Method D is at least 40% better than the state-of-the-art method. These improvements are of great value in practical QKD because the computational and time costs for classical post-processing can be quite high when the raw key length s X is long. More importantly, the McDiarmid inequality method reported here is effective to increase the key rate of real or close to real time on demand generation of the secret key -an application that is possible in near future with the advancement of laser technology.
In addition to QKD, powerful concentration inequalities in statistics such as McDiarmid inequality could also be used beyond straightforward statistical data analysis. One possibility is to use it to construct model independent test for physics experiments that involve a large number of parameters but with relatively few data points.
